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1 Introduction
The sub-prime crisis has caused massive destruction of welfare reinforcing the suspicion
that some trading activities on financial markets are potentially harmful. It was followed
by a surge of scholarly interest in trying to identify and curb potentially harmful trades.
Especially one category of trades has attracted lots of attention, namely trades based on
differences in beliefs about the future.
Trades with heterogeneous beliefs are ex ante welfare improving for the agents involved.
However different agents use different beliefs to evaluate trades. Hence the concern that
agents make mistakes such that welfare gains turn out to be welfare losses. That is why some
scholars consider Pareto domination to be an insufficient welfare criterion in case traders
have heterogeneous beliefs. Several refinements of the Pareto domination have subsequently
been proposed. These refinements aim at singling out, among all trades, those most likely
to harm, and form the foundation for some tightening of the regulation of financial markets.
However, well-functioning financial markets create welfare by allowing agents to trade
risks. Regulation should not prevent beneficial trades. Moreover for sets of fundamentals
for which it is not obvious whether trades are beneficial or not the regulator should be able to
argue for its decision by: pointing out its decision for other sets of fundamentals for which
its decision is obvious; and explaining how the two sets of fundamentals are similar. In
short, regulation should be consistent.
To meet these ends we propose three properties of regulation of trades with heteroge-
neous beliefs. First, the regulator should not object to trades with identical beliefs. Second,
if the regulator does not object to finitely many unrelated trades, all with identical beliefs,
then it should not object to the mere juxtaposition of the trades. Third, if the regulator does
not object to a trade that is the juxtaposition of two trades for the juxtaposition of two autar-
kic economies, then it should not object to any of the sub-trades for the associated autarkic
economy. We show that there is a unique policy having the three properties: Laissez-faire.
Obviously the result that solely laissez-faire has the three properties can be disturbing
or soothing depending on personal conviction. But the result in itself should not be dis-
cussed because it is simply a logical consequence of the three properties. However the three
properties can and should be discussed. Though we are biased in our evaluation of the
three properties, we do provide a somewhat detailed discussion of them – both in the next
subsection and in connection with the precise statements of them.
Illustration
To illustrate the problem and describe more precisely our contribution, let us introduce a
series of examples.
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Example 1: (Gilboa et al., 2014) There are two risk neutral agents, Ann and Bill, both
endowed with $1. There are two states of the world: In the first state s = 1 the oil price is
above $100 one year from now and in the second state s = 2 it is below. Ann believes the
probability of state s = 1 is 2/3. Bill believes the probability of state s = 1 is 1/3. Therefore
their expected utility functions are
UA(x1,x2) =
2
3
x1 +
1
3
x2 and UB(x1,x2) =
1
3
x1 +
2
3
x2.
They want to trade one for one such that they both receive $1 in the state they deem more
probable and deliver $1 in the state they deem less probable. This trade increases their
expected utilities from 1 to 4/3.
In Example 1 the sole reason for Ann and Bill to trade is the difference in their beliefs.
They have identical endowments and attitudes toward risk. Moreover they are risk-neutral
and their endowments are state-independent, so they have no insurance needs. Ann and Bill
are both taking advantage of the difference in their beliefs to speculate against each other,
betting on the other having mistaken beliefs. It is a pure bet. The trade could be considered
to cause more harm than good.
Some other trades would typically not be considered harmful, e.g., when for each agent
resources flow from the state deemed more probable to the state deemed less probable. An
example follows.
Example 2: There are the same two states as in Example 1. There are two agents with a
constant relative risk aversion of one. Cai is endowed with $2 in state s = 1 and $0.1 in state
s = 2, and believes the probability of state s = 1 is 2/3. Djal is endowed with $0.1 in state
s = 1 and $2 in state s = 2, and believes the probability of state s = 1 is 1/3. Their expected
utility functions are
UC(x1,x2) =
2
3
ln(x1)+
1
3
ln(x2) and UD(x1,x2) =
1
3
ln(x1)+
2
3
ln(x2).
They want to trade one for one such that Djal receives $1 in state s = 1 and Cai receives $1
in state s = 2. This trade increases their expected utilities.
In Example 2 trading occurs between agents with different beliefs, but this is not crucial
for justifying the trade. Indeed even if the two agents switched beliefs the trade would still
increase their expected utilities. Consequently the agents do not seem to speculate against
each other. Both agents are risk averse and the trade seems to be triggered by insurance
needs stemming from large endowment shocks. This trade would typically be considered
beneficial.
From a regulatory perspective it would be useful to separate potentially harmful, highly
speculative trades, triggered by differences in beliefs (as in Example 1) from more beneficial
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trades, triggered by insurance needs (as in Example 2). To do this in a systematic way we
adopt an axiomatic approach and identify three limits within which trades should not be
banned in order to prevent excessive regulation.
Three properties of regulation
Let us proceed with more illustrating examples. Since the examples use the same four agents
doing the same net-trades ending with the same final consumptions as in Examples 1 and 2,
we summarize their characteristics and net-trades in Table 1.
Endowment Belief Elementary utility Net-trade Consumption
Ann (1,1)
(
2
3
,
1
3
)
u(x) = x (1,-1) (2,0)
Bill (1,1)
(
1
3
,
2
3
)
u(x) = x (-1,1) (0,2)
Cai (2,0.1)
(
2
3
,
1
3
)
u(x) = ln(x) (-1,1) (1,1.1)
Djal (0.1,2)
(
1
3
,
2
3
)
u(x) = ln(x) (1,-1) (1.1,1)
Table 1: Characteristics and trades.
Example 3: There are two agents: Ann from Example 1 and Cai from Example 2. They
both believe that the probability of state s = 1 is 2/3. They want to trade one for one such
that Ann receives $1 in state s = 1 and Cai receives $1 in state s = 2.
In Example 3 trading is based on insurance needs caused by differences in endowments
and attitudes toward risk, but absolutely not on differences in beliefs: Ann and Cai have
identical beliefs. Unless the regulator has additional information, the standard notion of
Pareto domination should not be questioned. Hence we propose a first limit on regulation:
If all agents involved in a trade have identical beliefs, then the trade should be authorized.
We term this property: Unanimity (U).
The argument would be exactly the same in the following mirror image of Example 3.
Example 4: There are two agents: Bill from Example 1 and Djal from Example 2. They
both believe that the probability of state s = 1 is 1/3. They want to trade one for one such
that Djal receives $1 in state s = 1 and Bill receives $1 in state s = 2.
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To introduce our second limit on regulation, consider the juxtaposition of the two trades
in Examples 3 and 4.
Example 5: There are four agents: Ann, Cai, Bill and Djal. Ann and Cai trade as described
in Example 3 and Bill and Djal trade as described in Example 4.
There are agents with different beliefs in Example 5. Ann and Cai on one side believe the
probability of state s = 1 is 2/3, and Bill and Djal on the other side believe the probability is
1/3. However there is strictly no trade between agents with different beliefs, neither directly
nor indirectly. Consequently trading is not in any sense based on differences in beliefs. The
juxtaposition of the two trades does not introduce any speculation: Nobody is betting on
others having mistaken beliefs. Therefore we propose a second limit on regulation: If n
trades, in n autarkic economies, all involving agents with identical beliefs, are authorized,
then the juxtaposed trade in the juxtaposed economy should be authorized. We term this
property: Merge-Proofness of Autarky (MA).
To introduce our third limit on regulation, consider another way to frame Example 5.
Example 5’: There are four agents: Ann, Bill, Cai and Djal. They start with initial allocation
((1,1),(1,1),(2,0.1),(0.1,2)) and trade for final allocation ((2,0),(0,2),(1,1.1),(1.1,1)).
Suppose now that the trade in Example 5’ is authorized by the regulator. Let us frame
it, as in Example 5, as the juxtaposition of the two independent trades in Examples 3 and
4, each one occurring within an autarkic economy. What should the regulator do if the one
of these two trades is dropped? The removal of one of the trades (and of the corresponding
economy) does not introduce any speculation or betting. The number of different beliefs is
lower or unchanged. Hence there is no basis for the regulator to change its mind and ban
the remaining trade − the remaining trade should be authorized. We term this property:
Independence of Irrelevant Trade (IIT).
In Theorem 1 we show that Pareto domination is the unique regulatory principle sat-
isfying U, MA and IIT. The proof is simple and can be illustrated by using our series of
examples. The question could be whether the regulator should authorize the trade in Exam-
ple 1 between Ann and Bill. If it respects U, MA and IIT, the answer is yes.
To see why, let us introduce yet another way to frame Example 5’.
Example 5”: There are four agents: Ann, Bill, Cai and Djal. Ann and Bill trade as described
in Example 1 and Cai and Djal trade as described in Example 2.
Consider the trade in Example 1 between Ann and Bill. Let us now introduce Cai and
Djal. If the trades were as in Example 3 and Example 4, they would be authorized, in
compliance with U. Hence the trade in Example 5 and Example 5’ would be authorized,
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in compliance with MA. Since the trade in Example 5’ can be decomposed into two unre-
lated trades in two autarkic economies according to Example 5”, the trades in Example 1
and Example 2 would be authorized, in compliance with IIT. Hence a regulator which acts
consistently to the three properties U, MA and IIT should authorize the trade in Example 1,
as any other Pareto improvement.
Related literature
In this subsection, we give a broad overview of the literature. We will propose a more
detailed and technical discussion of how the literature confronts our axioms after the model
and our results are presented.
Stiglitz (1989) discusses taxes on transactions in financial markets to curb trading based
on differences in beliefs. In a series of papers Posner & Weyl (2013, 2013a, 2013b, 2014)
advocate that benefit-cost analysis should be used to evaluate the consequences on welfare
of new financial products. Though vast amounts of data documenting past trading might be
available, it remains a challenge to compute welfare in case of heterogeneous beliefs.
Another strand of the literature has circumvented the challenge by proposing refinements
of Pareto domination. Mongin (1997) suggests that the unanimity underpinning Pareto dom-
ination can be ‘spurious’, in the sense that it is based on differences in beliefs and tastes that
offset each other. Hence the requirement that unanimity be founded on the same reasoning.
Along this line, Gilboa et al. (2014) suggest that a trade should improve the welfare of every
agent not only for her own belief but also for some hypothetical common belief. In the same
vein, Gayer et al. (2014) strengthen the refinement in Gilboa et al.: A trade should improve
the welfare of every agent for everybody’s beliefs. Following another route, Brunnermeier
et al. (2014) propose a Bergsonian welfare function and suggest that a trade should improve
aggregate welfare for everybody’s beliefs. The refinements in Gilboa et al. (2014) and in
Gayer et al. (2014) both satisfy U and IIT, but violate MA. There are two interpretations of
the refinement in Brunnermeier et al. (2014). One satisfies U, but violates MA and IIT, the
other violates all three properties.
Blume et al. (2014) use different welfare functions to evaluate different financial market
designs. It is found that combinations of restrictions on the set of traded assets, borrowing
limits and transaction taxes can offer substantial welfare gains relative to complete financial
markets. Blume et al. (2014) and Posner & Weyl (2013) are both suggesting that financial
innovation can destroy welfare.
Duffie (2014) criticizes this literature. First, there is no compelling philosophical jus-
tification for banning speculative trade between consenting agents. Second, there is no
normative foundation for treating beliefs and tastes different: both are parts of personal
preferences. Third, beliefs and tastes cannot be separated: heterogeneous beliefs with state-
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independent tastes and identical beliefs with state-dependent tastes are indistinguishable
from an observational point of view.
In the present paper we work under the hypothesis that beliefs and tastes can be separated
and explore the possibility of having a regulatory principle banning potentially harmful
trades. Since we have an impossibility result, we do not perceive the hypothesis to be a
limitation.
2 The model
We use pure exchange economies with one good in every state as our framework. Since we
solely study changes from one allocation to another allocation there is no need to consider
endowments. Generalizations to multi-good economies and production economies easily
follow.
The setup
There is a finite number of states s ∈ {1, . . . ,S}. Let 4 = {pi ∈ RS+ | ∑spis = 1} be the set
of probability distributions on the set of states. In every state s there is one good.
A consumer i is described by her consumption set Xi ⊂ R, Bernoulli utility function ui :
Xi→R and belief pii ∈4. If consumer i plans to consume the bundle xi = (x1i , . . . ,xSi ) ∈ XSi ,
then her expected utility is ∑spisi ui(x
s
i ).
An economy E consists of a finite number of consumers so E = (Xi,ui,pii)i∈M where
M = {1, . . . ,m}. A common-belief economy is an economy E with pii = pih for every i,h ∈
M . For a pair of economies E and E ′, the economy (E,E ′) is simply the juxtaposition of E
and E ′.
Consider an economy E. An allocation is an m-tuple of consumption plans x = (xi)i∈M
so xi ∈ Xi for every i. For an allocation x a trade is a m-tuple µ = (µi)i∈M with ∑i µi = 0
such that x+µ is an allocation so xi+µi ∈ Xi for every i. LetM (µ) = { i ∈M | µi 6= 0} be
the set of consumers i who trade. An improving trade is a trade µ where for every i∈M (µ),
∑
s
pisi ui(x
s
i+µ
s
i ) > ∑
s
pisi ui(x
s
i ).
An improvement is an allocation and an improving trade (x,µ).
Consider an improvement (x,µ) for economy E and an improvement (x′,µ ′) for econ-
omy E ′. Then the juxtaposition of the improvements ((x,x′),(µ,µ ′)) is an improvement for
the juxtaposition of the economies (E,E ′).
Improvements are submitted to a regulator which either authorizes or bans them. The
regulator knows the characteristics of the agents but has no other information. In particular
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the regulator does not have any information about the likelihood of the different states. The
regulator is described by a function that maps economies E and improvements (x,µ) into
recommendations {0,1} where Γ(E,x,µ) = 1 corresponds to authorizing the improvement
and Γ(E,x,µ) = 0 corresponds to banning the improvement.
The upcoming questions are: What could be desirable properties for authorization func-
tions? How do authorization functions having these properties perform?
Three properties of regulation
Recall that speculative trades are characterized by two properties: agents having different
beliefs; and agents trading in order to take advantage of other agents having other beliefs.
A first question naturally arises: What should the policy recommend for common-belief
economies and improvements? Since all agents have identical beliefs, trades are, by defini-
tion, not speculative. Consequently all such trades should be authorized.
Unanimity (U) For a common-belief economy E and an improvement (x,µ),
Γ(E,x,µ) = 1.
It seems natural that the regulator should authorize all improvements in case of identical
beliefs. It can be seen as a classical unanimity condition: if all consumers have a common
belief and strictly prefer x+µ to x, then the improvement should be authorized.
Violating Axiom U would make sense in case the regulator had additional knowledge.
However the starting point of the paper is that the regulator does not have any information
about the likelihood of the different states.
A second question naturally arises: What should the regulator do when there is actually
no trade between agents with different beliefs (and thus no one tries to take advantage of
other agents having other beliefs)? Suppose the regulator authorized finitely many inde-
pendent improvements in finitely many autarkic common-beliefs economies. Should these
trades be banned if now submitted to the regulator as one trade – i.e. should the mere juxta-
position of the finitely many original trades result in trades being banned? Since juxtaposing
the trades does not introduce any speculation or betting, the regulator should not change its
mind. After all, agents solely trade with other agents having the same belief as themselves,
hence the trades are not speculative, and should therefore be authorized.
Merge-Proofness of Autarky (MA) For finitely many common-belief economies E, ...,E ′
and finitely many improvements (x,µ), . . . ,(x′,µ ′),
Γ(E,x,µ) = . . . = Γ(E ′,x′,µ ′) = 1
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implies
Γ((E, . . . ,E ′),(x, . . . ,x′),(µ, . . . ,µ ′)) = 1.
Axiom MA eliminates some forms of excessive inertia. Consider again the introductory
examples, and imagine N replicas of the pair Ann and Cai (Example 3) and one pair of Bill
and Djal (Example 4). For a large N, the economy is almost showing homogeneous beliefs.
For a rule violating MA, the presence of an outlier (here Bill and Djal), not involved in any
trade with the rest of the economy, would block the entire economy.
A third question naturally arises: What should the regulator do when part of an economy
and an improvement are dropped? Suppose the regulator authorizes the juxtaposition of two
independent trades in the juxtaposition of two autarkic economies. Should the trade for one
of the economies be banned just because the other trade and the other economy are dropped?
Dropping one of the trades (and of the corresponding economy) does not introduce any
speculation or betting. The number of different beliefs is lower or unchanged. Hence there
is no basis for the regulator to change its mind and ban the remaining trade – the remaining
trade should be authorized.
Independence of Irrelevant Trade (IIT) For two economies E,E ′ and two improvements
(x,µ),(x′,µ ′),
Γ((E,E ′),(x,x′),(µ,µ ′)) = 1
implies
Γ(E,x,µ) = 1.
Axiom IIT eliminates some forms of framing. Consider again Example 5’ and imagine the
trade is authorized. The trade can be seen as Ann and Bill trading as in Example 1 and Cai
and Djal trading as in Example 2 or Ann and Cai trading as in Example 3 and Bill and Djal
trading as in Example 4. The trade should not be banned just because either Cair and Djal
or Bill and Djal are dropped. The two agents left trade just like before the other two agents
were dropped.
3 The main result
In the present section we first show that our three axioms characterize Pareto domination,
discuss how the refinements proposed in the literature fare with respect to our axioms and
explain how the analysis extends to ambiguous beliefs.
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Laissez-faire
Our three axioms characterize laissez-faire.
Theorem 1 An authorization function Γ satisfies U, MA and IIT if and only if for all economies
E and all improvements (x,µ),
Γ(E,x,µ) = 1.
Proof: We leave it to the reader to check that the authorization function with Γ(E,x,µ) = 1
for all economies E and improvements (x,µ) satisfies U, MA and IIT. Consequently we
shall focus on the converse claim.
Consider an economy E and an improvement (x,µ). Define |M | economies (Ei)i∈M
with consumer i and a new consumer i+m in economy Ei for every i∈M (µ) and consumer
i and two new consumers i+m and i+2m for every i /∈M (µ).
For i with µi ∈ RS\RS+ suppose the new consumer i+m in economy Ei has elementary
utility function ui+m(xsi+m) = ln(x
s
i+m) and beliefs pii+m = pii. Let the consumption plan xi+m
for consumer i+m be defined by
xsi+m =
{
ε for µsi < 0
1+µsi for µ
s
i ≥ 0
where ε > 0. Since limε→0Ui+m(xi+m) = −∞ and limε→0Ui+m(xi+m−µi) > −∞ there is
ε > 0 such that Ui+m(xi+m) < Ui+m(xi+m−µi). Therefore zi = ((xi,xi+m),(µi,−µi)) is an
improvement for the common-belief economy Ei for every i∈M (µ).
For i with µi /∈RS\RS+ suppose the new consumers i+m and i+2m has elementary utility
function uk(xsk) = ln(x
s
k) and beliefs pik = pii for k∈{i+m, i+2m}. Consider an arbitrary
vector ν ∈ RS such that 0.5µi+ν ∈ RS\RS+, let xi+m and xi+2m be defined by
xsi+m =
{
ε for 0.5µsi−νs < 0
1−(0.5µsi +νs) for 0.5µsi−νs ≥ 0
xsi+2m =
{
ε for 0.5µsi +ν
s < 0
1+(0.5µsi +ν
s) for 0.5µsi +ν
s ≥ 0
where ε > 0. Let µi+m = −0.5µi+ν and µi+2m = −0.5µi−ν . Since limε→0Uk(xk) = −∞
and limε→0Uk(xk+µk) > −∞ for k ∈ {i + m, i + 2m} there is ε > 0 such that Uk(xk) <
Uk(xk+µk) for k ∈ {i+m, i+ 2m}. Therefore zi = ((xi,xi+m,xi+2m),(0,µi,−µi)) is an im-
provement for the common-belief economy Ei for every i /∈M (µ).
According to U, Γ(Ei,zi) = 1 for every i because Ei is a common-belief economy for
every i. According to MA,
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Γ((Ei)i,(zi)i) = 1.
According to IIT,
Γ(E,x,µ) = 1.
Hence laissez-faire is the unique policy satisfying U, MA and IIT. 2
Our theorem is disturbing for anyone sympathetic to the general agenda of protecting
consumers against the consequences of trade based on distorted beliefs. Probably even more
disturbing is the fact that restricting improvements to be equilibrium allocations associated
with Walrasian equilibria does not change Theorem 1 as we show in Corollary 1.
Corollary 1 Suppose that for all economies E and all improvements (x,µ) there are prices
p ∈ RS++ such that for every i, xi+µi is a solution to
max
ci
ui(ci)
s.t. p·ci = p·xi.
Then an authorization function Γ satisfies U, MA and IIT if and only if
Γ(E,x,µ) = 1.
Proof: The proof follows the proof of Theorem 1 except the choices of xi+m in case µi 6= 0
and xi+m and xi+2m as well as µi+m and µi+2m in case µi = 0 are more delicate.
In case µi ∈ RS\RS+, xi+m has to be chosen such that xi+m ∈ RS++ and xi+m−µi is the
solution to the consumer problem for consumer i+m. In case µi = 0, first ν ∈ RS has to
be chosen such that ν 6= 0 and p·ν = 0, second xi+m and xi+2m has to be chosen such that
xi+m,xi+2m ∈ RS++ and xi+m+ν is the solution to the consumer problem for consumer i+m
and xi+2m−ν is the solution to the consumer problem for consumer i+2m. Both cases are
trivial. 2
A way to escape the implication of our theorem and its corollary could be to regulate
trades one-by-one. In the appendix we show that regulation of trades one-by-one can be
subject to framing effects and introduce a property eliminating some of the framing effects.
Again the result is that laissez-faire is the unique rule satisfying our four properties.
Refinements of Pareto domination
Gilboa et al. (2014) propose a criterion to separate improvements triggered by differences in
beliefs as in Example 1 from improvements triggered by differences in insurance needs as in
Examples 2, 3 and 4. They require that there is some hypothetical common belief such that
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the improvement remains an improvement for this common belief. The resulting refinement
of Pareto domination is denoted No-Betting Pareto (NBP) dominance.
Regulation based on NBP dominance would satisfy U and IIT, but violate MA. Indeed,
applied to the introductory series of examples, an NBP-compliant regulator would authorize
the trades in Examples 2, 3 and 4, but ban the trades in 1 and 5. The reason why a NBP-
compliant regulator would ban the trade in Example 5 is that there is no common belief under
which both Ann and Bill would be better off. The problem is neither that they trade with
each other nor that they bet on their trading partner having mistaken beliefs as in Example
1: Both trade with someone having the same belief as they themselves have. The problem
is that their independent and unrelated actions cannot be rationalized by a common belief.
And this lack of rationalization could lead to reservations about whether the improvement
in Example 5 is actually an improvement.
Another criterion is proposed in Gayer et al. (2014). They require that for the belief
of every agent the improvement remains an improvement for this belief as common hypo-
thetical belief. Clearly the resulting refinement denoted Unanimity Pareto dominance is a
strengthening of Gilboa et al. (2014), but nevertheless it satisfies U and IIT, but violates MA
as illustrated by examples 3, 4 and 5.
Brunnermeier et al. (2014) take some set of beliefs as being ‘reasonable’ and require
that an improvement has to improve social welfare for all beliefs in the set of reasonable
beliefs as common hypothethical beliefs. The resulting refinement of Pareto domination is
denoted Belief-Neutral Social Welfare. In case the set of reasonable beliefs is a subset of the
convex hull of the beliefs of the agents the criterion would satisfy U, but violate MA and
IIT. In case the set of reasonable beliefs is unrelated to the beliefs of the agents the criterion
would violate U in addition to MA and IIT.
For a violation of MA consider two economies with two consumers and four states.
In the first economy, let ei ∈ R4 be the excess utility across states of consumer i ∈ {A,B}
with eA = (2,−1,1,−3) and eB = (−1,2,−3,1). Suppose the two consumers have identical
beliefs pi1 with pi11 = pi
2
1 > 2pi
3
1 = 2pi
4
1 . Then pi1·ei > 0 for both i in the first economy. In
the second economy, let eC = (1,−3,2,−1) for consumer C and eD = (−3,1,−1,2) for
consumer D. Suppose the two consumers have identical beliefs pi2 with pi12 = pi
2
2 < 0.5pi
3
2 =
0.5pi42 . Then pi2·ei > 0 for both i in the second economy. Suppose the set of reasonable
beliefs for every economy is the convex hull of the set of beliefs of the consumers in the
economy and the regulator uses the utilitarian welfare function. Then the regulator would
authorize the trades in the two economies, but ban the trades in the juxtaposed economy
because eA+eB+eC+eD = (−1,−1,−1,−1).
For a violation of IIT consider an economy with four consumers and four states. Sup-
pose the first two consumers i ∈ {A,B} trade with each other and last two consumers
12
i ∈ {C,D} trade with each other. For excess utilities and beliefs for the consumers let
eA = (1,−2,1,−2) and pi1A = pi3A > 2pi2A = 2pi4A, eB = (−2,1,−2,1) and pi1B = pi3B < 0.5pi2B =
0.5pi4B, eC = (−1,3,−1,3) and pi1C = pi3C < 3pi2C = 3pi4C and eD = (3,−1,3,−1) and pi1D =
pi3D > (1/3)pi
2
D = (1/3)pi4D. Suppose the set of reasonable beliefs for every economy is
the convex hull of the set of beliefs of the consumers in the economy and the regulator
uses the utilitarian welfare function. Then the regulator would authorize the trades because
eA+eB+eC+eD = (1,1,1,1), but ban the trade in the economy with consumers A and B
because eA+eB = (−1,−1,−1,−1).
For a violation of U in case the set of reasonable beliefs is fixed. Consider the consumers
A and B in the example of a violation of MA. Suppose the set of reasonable beliefs for every
economy is a singleton pi with pi1 = pi2 < 2pi3 = 2pi4 and the regulator uses the utilitarian
welfare function. Then it would ban the trade.
The contentious axiom for the literature is MA according to which the mere presence
of agents with different beliefs in the same state space does not warrant coercive public
action. Indeed, as long as agents trade with other agents with identical beliefs, trade should
be authorized. We could try to argue for the opposite. Assume two agents can both take a
pink pill or not where one of the actions is lifesaving and the other is lethal for both agents.
Suppose the two agents have opposite beliefs about consequences of the two actions. If one
of the agents comes to the regulator and exposes its belief and plan, then the regulator can
say nothing else than: ‘try your chosen action, and we’ll see whether you’ll die or not’. But
if both agents come to the regulator with their opposite beliefs, then the regulator knows for
sure that one of the agents is going to die and is facing a troubling conflict.
Forgetting about what the alternative to no-action would be in such a situation, it is rem-
iniscent of Pascal’s wager: We all live with mutually exclusive states, either God exists, or
He does not. For any non-trivial probability that God exists, one wants to be observant of re-
ligious rules given the pleasure of going to heaven and/or the pain of not going. Nevertheless
some of us are not observant. And there is no probability of God’s existence that rationalizes
both observance and non-observance. Consequently our sense is that the reservations about
whether the trade in Example 5 is actually an improvement build on considerations that are
very pervasive. We argue that opening the way to coercion based on the fact that people live
with the same state space could drive public action to intrusive shores.
Ambiguous beliefs
Our analysis and results straightforwardly extend to the case of ambiguous beliefs where
consumers have sets of beliefs Πi ⊂4, not necessarily singletons. Preferences can be as in,
e.g., Bewley (2002) or Gilboa & Schmeidler (1989) according to which consumer i prefers
bundle xi to bundle x′i provided respectively ∑spisi ui(x
s
i ) ≥ ∑spisi ui(x′si ) for all pii ∈ Πi or
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minpii∈Πi∑spisi ui(x
s
i )≥minpii∈Πi∑spisi ui(x′si ).
A common-belief economy in case of ambiguity is an economy E where consumers have
identical sets of beliefs: Πi = Πh for every i,h ∈M . Given this extended definition of
common-belief economies, all our axioms readily extend. It could be argued that coinci-
dence of sets of beliefs is less likely than coincidence of singleton beliefs (if, e.g., beliefs
are taken from a finite set, as percentages); in which case our axioms become even weaker.
Finally it can be checked immediately that our results remain valid.
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Appendix
A way to circumvent that beliefs in unrelated trades can block trades is to limit the regu-
lator to consider trades one-by-one. Unfortunately such a regulatory principle is subject to
framing effects. We show that in order to avoid framing effects the regulatory rule has to be
laissez-faire.
Multiple trades
Examples 5 and 5’ involve two different packages of trades, but in both cases the four
agents start with the same initial allocation ((1,1),(1,1),(2,0.1),(0.1,2)) and end up with
the same final allocation ((2,0),(0,2),(1,1.1),(1.1,1)). Regulation based on the different
refinements of Pareto optimality would ban trade between Ann and Bill in Example 5’, while
the trade between Cai and Djal would be authorized. Similarly the trades between Ann and
Cai as well as between Bill and Djal in Example 5 would be authorized.
There is no fundamental economic reason to differentiate between the two packages.
They start from exactly the same initial allocation, end up at exactly the same final allo-
cation and involve exactly the same beliefs. The sole difference is in the accounting of
the clearing house. The accounting is virtual and arbitrary, consequently we suggest that
it should not matter. Hence the regulator should not differentiate between these packages
of trades. Otherwise, it would be subject to a framing effect, pushing agents to waste time
looking for trading partners who enable them to circumvent the regulatory principle.
In order to avoid framing effects in regulation of trades one-by-one we propose a fourth
limit on regulation. It requires that the evaluation of every trade should depend on neither
the pattern of trade resulting in the allocation reached before the trade nor the pattern of
trade after the trade. In Corollary 2 we consider finite lists of trades and show that the
Pareto principle is the unique principle satisfying U, MA and IIT for one trade and Pattern
Independence for lists of trades.
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No framing
In order to tackle framing effects arising from packaging the same trade in different ways,
we need a richer setting where initial allocations and lists of trades rather than one trade
are evaluated. In such a setting the regulator can distinguish between different packages of
trades starting from the same initial allocation and ending at the same final allocation.
Now an improvement is a feasible allocation and a finite list of n trades (x,(µa)a) such
that every trade µc is an improving trade of the allocation obtained by starting with the
feasible allocation and adding the previous trades to it x+∑b<cµb. A one-trade improvement
is an improvement with one trade (x,µ).
With the change from one-trade improvements to multi-trade improvements the au-
thorization function changes to a function from economies and multi-trade improvements
(E,x,(µa)a) to multi-authorizations of trades {0,1}n. Banning a trade can change a subse-
quent trade from being improving to not being improving. However no assumption needs to
be made about evaluation of non-improving trades.
Our three properties U, MA and IIT carry over to the setting with lists of trades provided
they are restricted to one-trade improvements. In addition to these three properties, we
propose that regulation of a trade should depend on the intermediate allocations from which
it starts and to which it ends and nothing else. Hence, regulation of a trade should be
independent of the patterns of trade before and after it.
Pattern Independence (PI) For an economy E and an improvement (x,(µa)a),
Γb(E,x,(µa)a) = 1
for every b < c implies
Γc(E,x,(µa)a) = Γ(E,x+∑b<cµb,µc).
The PI axiom does not eliminate framing effects, but it implies that regulation of lists of
trades should be trade by trade. Moreover, PI is sufficient to pin down Pareto domination in
a setting with lists of trades.
Corollary 2 An authorization function Γ satisfies U, MA and IIT for all one-trade improve-
ments and PI for all improvements if and only if for all economies E and all improvements
(x,(µa)a),
Γ(E,x,(µa)a) = (1, . . . ,1).
Proof: We leave it to the reader to check that the authorization function with
Γ(E,x,(µa)a) = (1, . . . ,1)
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for all (E,x,(µa)a) satisfies U, MA, IIT and PI as specified in Corollary 2. Consequently
we shall focus on the converse claim.
Consider an economy E and an improvement (x,(µa)a). According to U, MA and IIT
as shown in Theorem 1, for every c, Γc(E,x+∑b<cµb,µc) = 1. Then, according to PI,
Γc(E,x,(µa)a) = 1 for every c. 2
Corollary 2 is reminiscent of Proposition 3 in Gayer et al. (2014) which states that if the set
of expected utility profiles is rectangular and convex, then the transitive closure of the pref-
erence relation defined by No-Betting-Pareto dominance is the standard Pareto domination.
However it must be noted that typically economies do not satisfy rectangularity.
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